学术
国际标准刊号：ISSN 1672-0598
国内统一刊号：CN 50-1154
摘 要:
文章以不对称信息市场中的委托——代理理论为指导,基于对企业人力资本特点的揭示,分析了人力资本市场由于不对称信息所带来的不利选择问题和道德风险问题.并就如何规避隐藏行动的道德风险问题,给出了解决办法——即建立有效的激励机制.[著者文摘]
文章出处:
《重庆工商大学学报：社会科学版》-2007年24卷3期 -59-63页
Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University Social Science Edition
栏目信息:
分 类 号:
文献标识码:
A
文章编号:
1672-0598（2007）03-0059-05
[参考文献]
Design of human capital incentive mechanism of an enterprise under information asymmetry
ZHANG Min （ Librabry ,Chongqing Education College, Chongqing 400067, China）
Abstract:
Based on the guidance of trust-agent mechanism in the market of information asymmetry and on the characteristics of human capital of an enterprise, this paper analyzes selective issues and moral risk issues of human capital because of asymmetric information and gives solutions to the problems about how to avoid moral risk of hidden behaviors, that is, effective incentive mechanism.[著者文摘]
Key words:
asymmetric information; human capital; incentive mechanism ; moral risk
收稿日期: 2007-05-07
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