学术
国际标准刊号：ISSN 1671-0924
国内统一刊号：CN 50-1053
摘 要:
客户知识共享有利于客户知识得到充分和全面的利用，提高知识的生产率。客户知识共享在一般情况下都需要参与各方付出一定的成本。运用完全信息博弈和不完全信息博弈模型，分析客户知识共享实现的可能性。[著者文摘]
文章出处:
《重庆工学院学报》-2007年21卷18期 -37-40页
Journal of Chongqing Institute of Technology
栏目信息:
分 类 号:
文献标识码:
A
文章编号:
1671-0924（2007）09-0037-04
[参考文献]
Analysis on the Game of Sharing Customers Knowledge in Commercial Banks
YE Chun-hong （School of Humanities and Social Science, Chongqing Institute of Technology, Chongqing 40050, China）
Abstract:
Sharing customer knowledge is helpful to make full use of the customer knowledge and improve knowledge productivity, and it also involves each party paying for some costs. With the model of complete information game and incomplete information game, this paper analyzes the feasibility of sharing customer knowledge.[著者文摘]
Key words:
commercial bank; sharing customer knowledge; game analysis
收稿日期: 2007-03-22
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